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Abstract: 
 
Since the mid-1990s, governments of different political persuasion have tried to reform VET 
policy to address problems in skills formation and social inclusion. Despite considerable poli-
cy activism, success has been somewhat limited, and England failed to overcome the prob-
lems associated with its liberal training regime. This paper assesses the failure in vocational 
skills formation as a political economy and a public policy problem. It challenges the deter-
minism in the political economy literature, points to poor public policy making, and outlines 
possible policy levers. 
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Caught up in the Past? 
Social Inclusion, Skills, and Vocational Education and Training Policy in England 
 
Across the political spectrum, vocational education and training (VET) and especially appren-
ticeships receive considerable attention (Steedman, 2011). VET is widely considered a key 
policy strategy for improving the job prospects of young people with low skills (which have 
been described as a ‘new social risk’ in post-industrial societies; Bonoli, 2005; Taylor-Gooby, 
2004). In addition to this social inclusion dimension, VET policy has the capacity to address 
key economic concerns, especially poor productivity by international standards. It has been 
long recognised that large parts of the British economy are trapped in a ‘low skills/low 
productivity equilibrium’, in which companies compete in markets for low-quality goods 
where low (labour) costs are critical for market success (Finegold & Soskice, 1988). This is 
not to argue that the economy has no high-skills industries. In fact, a few sectors (such as 
banking, advertising and bio-technology) display high productivity and competitiveness, and 
firms benefit from the highly flexible UK labour market. However, in most service sectors 
and manufacturing, the economy suffers from a lack of intermediate skills, leaving the coun-
try with a high degree of skills polarisation (see also Hillmert, 2008; Fuller & Unwin, 2003; 
Green, 2001). The great reliance on a few competitive industries led both policy-makers and 
academic observers, in the wake of the Great Recession, call for a ‘rebalancing of the econo-
my’ for less reliance on the financial sector in particular. The policy objective of revitalising 
manufacturing is thought to require a boost in vocational skills; and the idea of a highly 
skilled workforce as a source for both global competiveness and social justice has been de-
scribed as a “secular religion throughout the developed world” (Brown, 2001: 236).  
England, however, does not have a strong track record in VET policy. The failure of 
VET is typically ascribed to the country’s liberal training regime and, more generally, its lib-
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eral political economy (Finegold & Soskice, 1988; Hall & Soskice, 2001). Liberal training 
regimes are characterised by a great reliance on the market and general education in skills 
formation. Firms are not greatly committed to initial VET but instead offer some rather firm-
specific ‘on-the-job’ training. This is in sharp contrast to the apprenticeship model of Ger-
man-speaking countries in particular, where employers are heavily involved in industry-
specific skills formation which combines on-the-job training with considerable classroom 
learning. Also, the state displays low commitment to vocational training in liberal countries, 
in terms of both regulatory intervention and the mobilisation of financial resources. In the 
UK, with its liberal training regime, firms show very limited interest in up-skilling their work-
forces and little engagement in VET. In addition to their product market strategies, employers 
are said to be driven by a fear of ‘poaching’. Caught in the low skills/low productivity equi-
librium –at least as far as large parts of the economy are concerned– made observers speak of 
‘market failure’ in VET (see also OECD, 2009).  
Acknowledging the failure in vocational skills formation, governments of different po-
litical persuasion displayed some significant policy activism to improve intermediate skills. 
After a brief historical account of the Thatcher government’s VET policy, the paper discusses 
and assesses the reforms of VET during the Major (1990-97), New Labour (1997-2010) and 
Coalition governments (2010-15), with a focus on government-funded apprenticeships and, 
more generally, work-based training. Despite considerable activism in this policy domain, it is 
concluded that VET policy has not overcome the problems that are commonly associated with 
the liberal training regime. In the conclusions, we also provide a brief, preliminary assessment 
of the current Conservative government. With reference to the institutionalist path depend-
ence theory, this article assesses the continued failure of VET policy as a political economy 
and public policy problem.  
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The Fall and Rise of VET: From Thatcher to Major  
After a brief ‘intermezzo’ of intervention in vocational training starting in 1964 with the es-
tablishment of Industrial Training Boards (ITBs), England moved firmly back onto its volun-
taristic trajectory with the election of the Thatcher government in 1979. Employers success-
fully mobilised against ITBs, which were abolished in 1981. The Manpower Services Com-
mission (MSC), established in 1973 to coordinate training policy across industry sectors and 
to give employers and trade unions a stronger voice in training policy though later abolished 
by Thatcher, became pre-occupied with rising youth unemployment. In 1983, the Youth 
Training scheme was created as a labour market programme to improve the employability of 
the young unemployed for a better re-integration into the labour market. However, the quality 
of vocational training, typically provided by private for-profit agencies, was generally consid-
ered to be rather poor. Instead of competing with Germany’s ‘dual system’ of vocational 
training as ambitiously proclaimed, the scheme producing NVQ Level 2 qualifications was 
associated with cheap labour, social engineering and the ‘manipulation’ of unemployment 
figures. In the face of high youth unemployment in the 1980s, training policy moved away 
from traditional apprenticeships as a means of vocational skills formation, and the govern-
ment’s strong belief that the market was the best means to deliver training translated into 
modest programmes for the young unemployed and school-leavers who struggled to find em-
ployment. VET was reduced to an instrument to deal with the growing problem of mass youth 
unemployment (Goodwin, Hills, & Ashton, 1999; King, 1997; Payne & Keep, 2011). 
In the face of the UK’s continued industrial underperformance by international stand-
ards (which was, among other things, related to skills deficits and poor training), the con-
servative Major government acknowledged that policies introduced in the 1980s failed to de-
liver the skills deemed imperative for economic success. Essentially accepting the failure and 
shortcomings of Youth Training (leading to Level 2 qualifications), the government intro-
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duced the so-called Modern Apprenticeship programme to improve the provision of Level 3 
qualifications. With the ambition to break with the poor image of Youth Training, the gov-
ernment envisaged employers to ‘own’ apprenticeships in their sectors but business showed 
little enthusiasm. The Major government might have started with the motivation to create a 
training system that could compete with the best in Europe, but commentators viewed the 
Modern Apprenticeship as ‘evolving’ from the Youth Training scheme. Both in terms of 
quantity and quality, Modern Apprenticeships, standing by the trust in the market and volun-
tarism, did not match the high standards that were common in Continental Europe, and thus 
the government failed to address the problem of intermediate skills (Brockmann, Clarke, & 
Winch, 2010; Fuller & Unwin, 2003; Hogarth, Gambin, & Hasluck, 2012). 
 
On a Trodden Path: New Labour’s VET Policy 
With the election of the New Labour government in 1997, we observed a period of both con-
tinuity and change in vocational training policy. New Labour adhered to the voluntaristic ap-
proach of its predecessor as far as training in companies was concerned. Here, one finds the 
persistent commitment to neoliberalism and the rhetoric of the market. However, the new 
government, convinced of the importance of skills for economic performance and social in-
clusion, ascribed a greater role to the state in skills formation and increased substantially pub-
lic spending on further education (Rainbird, 2010; Simmons, 2010).
1
 New Labour’s approach 
was essentially characterised by a strategy of improving publicly funded VET that was 
thought to translate into better skills utilisation by employers and ultimately greater produc-
tivity and competitiveness of the economy; this has been described as a skills-supply ap-
proach (Payne & Keep, 2011).  
                                                        
1 Between 1998 and 2009, further education saw an average annual real increase of 7.7%, which was (besides 
capital spending) the largest increase in the education budget (Chowdry & Sibieta, 2011). 
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In addition to the increasing of public spending, New Labour engaged in institutional 
reform. As its conservative predecessor, the New Labour government acknowledged the criti-
cal importance of apprenticeships for the formation of vocational skills. It, however, believed 
that the target of Level 3 qualifications undermined the expansion of apprenticeship numbers. 
It was a common place for employers to claim that they lacked applicants that met the educa-
tional prerequisites for Level 3 apprenticeships (Steedman, 2011). Reforming the Modern 
Apprenticeship programme of the Major government, New Labour sought to create a ‘voca-
tional ladder’, which leads from Foundation (Level 2) to Advanced Apprenticeships (Level 3) 
and then to two-year Foundation Degrees as vocational qualification in higher education 
(Fuller & Unwin, 2003). Yet, the envisaged ‘vocational ladder’ failed to deliver the desired 
results. Whilst the apprenticeship programme that was initially thought to largely produce 
skills at Level 3, it was eventually dominated by Level 2 qualifications (House of Commons, 
2015).
2
 Thus, the revised apprenticeship framework did not deliver the intermediate skills that 
were deemed imperative for industrial success. Also, Foundations Degrees saw very low take-
up. In this context, it is worthy to note that apprenticeships at Level 2 would not typically be 
considered an apprenticeship qualification in Continental European countries, where Level 3 
qualifications are the norm in apprenticeships (Brockmann, et al., 2010; Payne & Keep, 
2011). In addition, unlike the Continental practice, the great majority of apprenticeships were 
not provided by employers but private training providers (Page & Hillage, 2006; Payne & 
Keep, 2011). Unsurprisingly, New Labour’s apprenticeship scheme, as the programme of its 
predecessor, failed to break with the poor image of government-sponsored training pro-
grammes among young people, their parents and employers. Because of their low status and 
poor quality of training, English apprenticeships are “commonly regarded as an undemanding 
                                                        
2 When Labour entered office in 1997, it found about 75,000 young people starting a Level 3 apprenticeship (the 
Major government’s Modern Apprenticeship), which only increased very modestly by 14,000 to 89,000 in 
2009/10 when Labour left the government. By contrast, Labour’s Level 2 apprenticeships had 190,500 starts in 
2009/10 (House of Commons, 2015). 
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route for low attaining students” (Brockmann, et al., 2010: 116; see also Hogarth, et al., 2012; 
Fisher & Simmons, 2012). Reviewing New Labour’s track record in vocational training poli-
cy, it has been argued that the government, in practice, prioritised the objective of social in-
clusion over skills formation (Rainbird, 2010; Steedman, 2011). As with Youth Training, La-
bour’s apprenticeship became a means of managing youth unemployment; and rather than 
building on genuine employer demand, private training providers (on behalf of the public) 
commonly found themselves in a position where they had to ‘persuade’ employers to take on 
apprentices (Fuller & Unwin, 2003).  
Concerned about the overall low skills level across the workforce (as compared to 
other advanced economies), the government shifted its focus from labour market entrants to 
adult workers with low skills.
3
 In 2005, New Labour, as outlined in the 2003 Skills Strategy, 
established an Adult Entitlement to Learning
4
 to tackle the problem of the large share of basi-
cally unqualified workers (Page & Hillage, 2006; EIROnline, 31 May 2005). For the over-25s 
without Level 2 qualification, the Train-to-Gain (T2G) programme was established to encour-
age employers with subsidies to up-skill their workforce. This new flagship policy was 
thought to appeal to employees, as it not only provided them with an opportunity to improve 
their qualifications but also to certify existing vocational skills (Mazenod, 2014; Payne & 
Keep, 2011).  
In addition to substantial policy instrument changes, the New Labour government re-
vised the governance structure of VET. In 2001, replacing the Training and Enterprise Coun-
cils established by Thatcher, the government (with support from employers and trade unions) 
                                                        
3 One third of workers received very little or no systematic training from their employer, and most of these 
workers were without Level 2 qualification. Furthermore, about one fifth of the workforce did not have basic 
literacy skills (at the level of an 11-year-old or below) and one in five also struggled with numeracy (EIROnline, 
5 March 2003). 
4 The Entitlement to Adult Learning provided full tuition remission for all adults to achieve a first full vocational 
Level 2 qualification. With this entitlement, learners could also fund very basic courses improving literacy and 
numeracy skills. Adults under 25 years could furthermore qualify for a Level 3 qualification, which however was 
not restricted to vocational qualification. 
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created the national Learning and Skills Council and 47 local Learning and Skills Councils 
(LSCs), which were assigned the responsibility of funding all post-compulsory education and 
training (with the important exception of higher education).
5
 Employers were given 40% of 
seats on these bodies, whereas trade unions could only apply for one seat. The same applied 
to Sector Skills Councils (SSCs), which had the main responsibility of identifying sectoral 
skills need and occupational standards (Cuddy & Leney, 2005; Keep, Lloyd, & Payne, 2010; 
Rainbird, 2010). As part of the 2003 Skills Strategy, the government established (again with 
support from employers and unions) the so-called Skills Alliance, which was thought to rep-
resent a new social partnership for skills between the government, CBI, TUC and the Small 
Business Council. Admittedly, employer and trade union representatives gained some greater 
prominence through the Skills Alliance. However, it has been questioned whether they exer-
cised substantive impact on the government’s VET policy. As far as trade unions were con-
cerned, we saw New Labour breaking with the outspoken hostility of the previous conserva-
tive government, and the new government employed a new rhetoric of inclusiveness. In prac-
tice, however, organised labour did not gain much greater voice, and we did not observe the 
building of social partnership under Labour leadership. Rather than genuinely including busi-
ness and unions in decision-making, the government appeared to have used the Alliance in-
strumentally to ‘champion’ its policies (Clough, 2007; Keep, et al., 2010). The tenure of the 
Skills Alliance was short-lived. Following the Leitch Review and its recommendations, the 
government replaced, in 2008, the Alliance with the UK Commission of Employment and 
Skills (UKCES) for the strategic co-ordination of employment and skills policy. Leitch 
viewed the Skills Alliance as ‘ministerially-led’ and intended the new commission as a means 
to give employers a greater voice. Unions were, as on other bodies, represented but again in a 
marginalised role (Keep, et al., 2010; Rainbird, 2010). 
                                                        
5 Whilst the national council was responsible for setting the national framework and resource allocation, the lo-
cal councils overlooked of the day-to-day running of training programmes. 
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Although the rhetoric of the New Labour government emphasised the critical role of 
employers (as the previous government did), employers failed to develop a strong voice in 
VET. With the termination of the MSC, we saw the end of collective business representation 
in this policy domain. Instead, one pursued a representation of individual employers in state-
created and state-funded institutions, which were essentially created to deliver government 
policies in a top-down manner. With reference to LSCs, for instance, it was questioned to 
what extent these councils were actually ‘employer-led’ as suggested by the government. 
LSCs were concerned with policy delivery and played a very minimal role in policy-making, 
which was dominated by central government. Employers were typically hardly involved in 
the development of targets, for instance. Likewise, SSCs did not provide businesses with fo-
rums for meaningful voice. It was criticised that employer organisations were very poorly in-
volved (with no formalised relationship), and one could also observe rather conflictual rela-
tions between SSCs and employers’ organisations (e.g. with the Engineering Employers Fed-
eration) (Keep, et al., 2010). 
Overall, it seems fair to conclude that VET policy under New Labour experienced an 
“extraordinary centralisation” (Rainbird, 2010: 257; see also Clough, 2007), where policies 
were pursued in a top-down approach. This applied, most importantly, to the national LSC 
with great power to set the national framework for VET policy and to allocate resources to 
local LSCs, but also to initiatives such as the Skills Alliance. It was difficult to see a strong 
voice of employers, as social partnership remained rather illusive. Towards the end of its ten-
ure in government, Labour announced the abolition of LSCs, and replaced it with the Young 
People’s Learning Agency (for 14-19 year-olds) and the Skills Funding Agency (for further 
education). In VET policy, we find government as “system architect” (Keep, et al., 2010: 
411), dominating the policy domain and changing the institutional structure single-handedly 
when it was felt appropriate. VET policy can be thus described as a field of little institutional 
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continuity – but without change that undermines the fundamental principles of policy design. 
In other words, despite the state claiming a stronger role, the central liberal underpinning of 
VET policy (i.e. the trust in employer voluntarism and the market) was not challenged during 
the tenure of the New Labour government.  
 
The Coalition Government: A Turn-Around in VET?  
As with the previous Labour government, the conservative-liberal Coalition government 
(2010-15) stressed the importance of raising skills for economic growth and prosperity, as 
well as for social inclusion. In the new government’s skills strategy, one also observed that 
the skills supply approach continued to inform policy, as one finds the familiar rhetoric of 
putting “employers in the lead” (HM Government, 2011: 26). Importantly, the Coalition gov-
ernment expressed a strong commitment to apprenticeships as the “gold standard in vocation-
al training” (DfE & BIS, 2013: 20), and acknowledged the importance of Level 3 qualifica-
tions and the progression to Level 4, for which a new ‘Higher Apprenticeship’ was intro-
duced. To increase the number of apprenticeships, the Coalition committed some additional 
funds, but these came from other programmes, which experienced severe budget cuts. In its 
efforts to consolidate the public finances, the government did not spare further education, and 
imposed a budget reduction of 25%. Thus, prioritising budget consolidation, the Coalition ef-
fectively foreclosed a more ambitious training policy (DfE & BIS, 2013; Payne & Keep, 
2011; HM Government, 2011; UKCES, 2013). 
Whilst full training costs are covered for the 16-18 year olds, the government only 
provides 50% for the 19-24 year olds and up to 50% for the over-25s (House of Commons, 
2014: 3). Generally, for post-19 apprenticeships, government expected greater co-funding 
from employers or the individual. Learners, however, showed great reluctance to fund their 
training. The further education loan system to fund apprenticeships for adult learners was 
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terminated less than one year after coming into operation, as it only attracted 795 applications 
instead of the government’s expectation of 25,000 applicants (House of Commons, 2014).6 
Despite spending cuts in VET, the re-direction of resources (e.g. from the termination of the 
Train-to-Gain programme) allowed a significant increase in apprenticeship starts from 
280,000 in 2009/10 to 509,000 in 2015/16 (House of Commons, 2016). The recent increase, 
however, has been described as a “limited success” (Gregg, 2014), as the by far biggest in-
crease can be found among apprenticeships of the over-25s (from 49,000 to 224,000 appren-
ticeship starts in the same period).
7
 In terms of skills levels, despite much rhetoric, we ob-
serve the continued dominance of Level 2 qualifications with 57% of all new apprentices 
(House of Commons, 2016). Adult apprenticeships can have a great appeal to government, as 
these receive much less support than apprenticeships for the under-19s, and accordingly allow 
the increasing of apprenticeship numbers at lower costs to the public purse. Adult apprentice-
ships are also thought to appeal to employers to train existing staff. Instead of genuinely im-
proving vocational skills, however, adult apprenticeships are often restricted to formalising 
already existing skills (Steedman, 2011; UKCES, 2013), and it is suggested that the recent 
rise among the over-25s is actually the product of the ‘rebranding’ of employees on Train-to-
Gain as apprentices (Lupton, Unwin, & Thomson, 2015). 
Whilst English apprenticeships used to have a typical length from one to two years 
(compared to three to four years in Continental European countries with an apprenticeship 
tradition) (UKCES, 2013), it received much criticism that many government-funded appren-
                                                        
6 Also, especially as far as desired Level 3 qualifications are concerned, it remains unclear why employers should 
make the expected financial contributions, if it is possible to recruit cost-free Level 4 qualifications from univer-
sities. Hence, in the end, training costs might remain with the individual (Payne & Keep, 2011).  
7 By contrast, the under-19s have seen very little progress (from 117,000 to 131,000). The group of 19-25 year 
olds has had a slightly clearer increase (from 114,000 to 154,000) but little in comparison to the sharp rise 
among the over-25s. 
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ticeships had a duration of less than 12 months.
8
 Although the Coalition government intro-
duced a minimum duration of 12 months, it still allowed shorter apprenticeships for the over-
19 year olds. Also, the government introduced the requirement of at least 280 hours of ‘guid-
ed learning’ in the first 12 months, and 30% or 100 hours (whatever is greater) must be deliv-
ered off-the-job (House of Commons, 2014).  
As with the New Labour government, the conservative-liberal Coalition engaged in 
policy reform, but without challenging the liberal underpinnings of VET policy. In the follow-
ing, VET policy is assessed in greater detail. We first discuss whether the failure in VET poli-
cy is the result of a fundamental political economy problem, before approaching the problem 
from a public policy point of view. 
 
The Failure of VET in Britain: A Political Economy Problem? 
Although substantial public resources have been provided, it has been widely criticised that 
governments failed to make significant improvements in the skills profiles of the workforce. 
Provision focusses Level 2 rather than Level 3 qualifications; the latter dominates in Conti-
nental European countries with a strong VET tradition. Thus, despite a strong rhetoric to 
promote intermediate skills for greater productivity and competitiveness, government (regard-
less of political orientation) can be seen as prioritising quantity over quality in actual policy. 
In short, the social inclusion rationale (as in the Youth Training schemes of the 1980s) still 
‘trumps’ skills formation (Fuller & Unwin, 2003; Rainbird, 2010; Steedman, 2011). Especial-
ly in situations of high youth unemployment, it is in principle understandable that government 
has an interest in reaching a great number of young people with labour market and training 
programmes. However, with the exception of a few sectors (such as manufacturing), poor 
                                                        
8 In 2011, for instance, the retailer Morissons employed one in ten English apprentices, which made up around 
40% of Morissons’ entire workforce. An apprenticeship with Morissons had a typical length of 6 months (BBC, 
2 April 2012). 
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quality is ascribed to government-funded VET and apprenticeships (Rainbird 2010). A gov-
ernment-commissioned report, the Wolf Review, concluded that many low-level vocational 
qualifications have virtually no labour market returns (Wolf, 2011); and also the OECD 
(2009) questions the labour market value of Level 2 qualifications and notes possible tensions 
between the government’s focus on Level 2 qualifications and employers’ principle interest in 
Level 3 and 4 qualifications (see also National Audit Office 2005). Not only does the predom-
inance of Level 2 qualifications raise concerns over the effectiveness of the social inclusion 
strategy (if the labour market chances of young unemployed are not significantly improved), 
it also raises, more generally from a skills policy point of view, the question as to whether 
government funds are actually sensibly used. Furthermore, if government-funded VET provi-
sion presents itself as a means of social inclusion rather than skills formation, this reinforces 
the widely perceived low status of vocational qualifications in England – making it more dif-
ficult to elevate the social status of VET. 
Related to the concern about the efficiency of resource allocation, it has also been crit-
ically noted that policy expansion has put a great emphasis on adult vocational training in-
stead of a firm focus on initial VET for youngster, especially school-leavers. Whilst New La-
bour’s policies were first geared towards young people, adult training quickly gained promi-
nence, as for instance expressed in the Train-to-Gain programme for the over-25s as New La-
bour’s flagship programme. It has been criticised that much activity in this programme was 
concerned with the certification of existing skills rather than genuine skills formation. This 
can be considered a costly exercise of ‘virtual learning’ that does not actually improve quali-
fication levels but helps the government targets formally meeting its skills targets (Fuller & 
Unwin, 2011). The recent expansion of apprenticeships by the current Coalition government 
has also, as discussed earlier, focused on adult apprenticeships for the over-25s, which allows 
‘volume’ at less costs compared to initial VET (National Audit Office, 2012). 
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Understanding the failure of VET policy as skills policy draws our attention to the role 
of employers and the wider political-economic context of the UK. It is well documented in the 
literature that employers continue to display very limited policy engagement and much reluc-
tance to offer apprenticeships despite significant public resources for VET (Fuller & Unwin, 
2003; Hogarth, et al., 2012; Payne & Keep, 2011). The literature commonly points to the ear-
lier mentioned ‘low skills/low productivity equilibrium’ (cf. Finegold & Soskice, 1988) in 
attempts to explain the continued limited engagement of employers. Whilst the UKCES 
(2009) diagnoses a skills gap of around 1.8 million people (with an estimated loss of revenue 
of 10 billion GBP per year, or 165,000 GBP for a typical company with 50 employees accord-
ing to the National Audit Office [2005]), it also notes an increasing number of employees 
who are over-qualified for their current jobs. Critically, it is suggested that the problem in 
skills policy can be located on the demand side with “too few high performance workplaces, 
too few employers producing high quality goods and services, too few businesses in high val-
ue added sectors” (UKCES, 2009: 11). This assessment questions the skills-supply approach 
that has been informing English VET and, more generally, skills policy over last 20 years. 
UKCES continues with the suggestion of a “long tail” (ibid: 12) of poorly qualified managers, 
calling for economic and industrial policy in order to raise the ambitions of employers. How-
ever, critical voices would be fast to interject that “the state has little scope for influencing 
employer practices” (Rainbird, 2010: 242). In their critique of the skills-supply approach, 
Payne and Keep (2011), on the one hand, suggest relatively low demand for Level 3 skills as 
compared to other countries and a corresponding reluctance of employers to co-fund Level 3 
qualifications; on the other hand, they also attribute the failure of engage employers to public 
policy: “the problem may reflect a realisation on the part of employers that if they did not 
train themselves, the Government would step in and do this for them through an expanded 
further and higher education system” (ibid: 13). In this context, it is also important to recall 
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that most government-funded training and apprenticeships are not managed by employers but 
private training providers as intermediaries between government, employers and young peo-
ple (Keep, et al., 2010; Oultram, 2012), raising the issue whether produced qualifications are 
actually needed by employers (Rainbird, 2010).  
The modest track record of government policy and the evidence of continuous failure 
to engage employers provide, prima facie, some considerable support for the thesis of a fun-
damental political economy problem at the heart of England’s poor record in vocational skills 
formation, and that government efforts to promote vocational skills are futile. Not only are 
liberal market economies such as England ascribed a ‘natural’ strength in general skills 
(which is typically thought to have facilitated post-industrialisation and the associated 
growth of service sector employment), the very set-up of their political economies (as 
discussed earlier) are seen as effectively undermining vocational skills formation (cf. 
Hall & Soskice, 2001, especially for the concept of ‘institutional complementarities). 
However, VoC and the institutionalist literature more generally with its concept of path de-
pendence have been criticised for their bias towards stability, and a growing empirical and 
theoretical body of research suggests greater scope for institutional change than commonly 
assumed in the institutionalist political economy literature (Deeg & Jackson, 2007; Mahoney 
& Thelen, 2010). Returning English VET policy, the notion of the low skills/low produc-
tivity equilibrium might be viewed as being too deterministic. For instance, although 
UKCES sees in principle a demand problem, it also reports a lack of technicians with 
intermediate technical skills (UKCES, 2013), which could be thought as providing a fer-
tile market for certain technical apprenticeships.  Turning towards the service sector, the 
commission’s assessment of skills needs in the financial sector identifies a demand for voca-
tional skills in this industry for greater productivity and competitiveness (UKCES, 2010). 
These two examples indicate the viability of (targeted) investments in VET in a liberal market 
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economy, despite some compelling evidence for a low skills/low productivity equilibrium 
(see also National Audit Office, 2012 on the return of apprenticeships). The analysis of past 
skills policy also uncovers some poor policy-making. For instance, in its review of VET poli-
cies, “the OECD team was struck by a number of issues where data and analysis, particularly 
from international sources, could be used more fully to advance policy-making in England” 
(OECD, 2009: 33). This raises the issue whether the failure of VET policy is a public policy 
rather than a fundamental political economy problem. In the next section, key parameters of 
VET policy are discussed, which suggests that it might be rather premature to reduce the fail-
ure in VET to a political economy problem.  
 
The Failure of VET in Britain: Just a Public Policy Problem? 
The examination of English VET policy, including a number of reports by the National Audit 
Office (NAO) and the House of Commons’ Committee of Public Accounts, raise serious con-
cerns that point to poor public policy-making, which might account for the limited progress in 
VET in spite of the mobilisation of substantial resources. Whilst the NAO is generally posi-
tive towards VET and apprenticeships in terms of their economic benefits and value for the 
public purse (National Audit Office, 2012), it casts some doubts on the government’s resource 
allocation, and in particular identifies ‘additionality’ as a major problem. This was first raised 
in 2005, when the NAO noted the “risk that subsidies for first Level 2 training may be used 
for training by many of the overall minority of employers who would have undertaken it an-
yway” (2005: 34). The Committee of Public Accounts shares the concerns expressed by the 
NAO in its critical assessment of the Train-to-Gain programme, in which “around half of em-
ployers whose employees received training say they would have arranged similar training 
without public subsidy, and two-thirds had used Train to Gain to help to meet legal require-
ments to train staff” (House of Commons, 2010: 13). In a 2012 report, the NAO notes critical-
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ly that the government has failed to address the problem of additionality despite its attention 
being drawn to this, as it notes more generally that government targets for some sectors are 
not based on evidence of economic returns  and that government is not clear about its “strate-
gic direction” in the apprenticeship programme (National Audit Office, 2012). 
As a specific example of poor public policy-making, it can be referred to the Commit-
tee of Public Accounts’ assessment of the Train-to-Gain programme, where one finds “serious 
weaknesses in the way the programme has been managed” (House of Commons, 2010: 3). 
The programme started ambitiously with “unrealistically high” (ibid: 5) targets, which overes-
timated demand from employers and the capacity of training providers; and accordingly 
Train-to-Gain underspent. The government then widened eligibility criteria for the pro-
gramme, which created more demand than the programme could afford -- resulting instead in 
overspending and an “unacceptable position where too much training is in the pipeline and 
employers with new requirements are being turned away” (ibid). The Committee also draws 
attention to a risk of fraud in the practice of sub-contracting and to low success rates. In light 
of the experience with the Train-to-Gain programme, it does not come with much surprise 
that the NAO (2012: 21) associates the recent rapid expansion of (adult) apprenticeships with 
risks to quality. 
Related to the issue of quality, the NAO views critically the earlier reported rise of ap-
prenticeships lasting six months or less -- from 12% in 2008/09 to 19% in 2010/11.
9
 The 
NAO highlights the “risk that shorter apprenticeships do not allow enough time for training 
and the development of apprentices’ skills” (2012: 24). More candidly, the Committee of 
Public Accounts expresses its “concerns about the number of short programmes classified as 
apprenticeships and about the quality and amount of training some apprentice receive which 
we consider inadequate and poses risks to the value of the programme to individuals and em-
                                                        
9 Some sectors show particularly high numbers of short apprenticeships. For instance, in IT, one of the fastest 
growing sectors, 68% of apprentices finish in six months or less. 
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ployers” (House of Commons, 2012: 4). The new standard minimum of 12 months was meant 
to address this problem, although exceptions for adult apprenticeships (where most growth 
took place) call into question the effectiveness of this new requirement. The Committee also 
criticises that only less than half of apprentices received off-the-job training. With regard to 
the modest requirement of ‘guided learning’ (of which 100 hours are delivered off-the-job 
compared to a minimum of 900 hours in German-speaking countries; Steedman, 2011: 3), the 
NAO, however, notes “that is it unclear how the number of guided hours will be defined, 
monitored and enforced in practice” (2012: 24).10 An issue with compliance one also finds 
with the failure of training providers to collect expected contributions from employers. 
(ibid).
11
 
The scrutiny of the funding regime also questions efficient and effective resource allo-
cation. It has attracted much criticism that the funding regime since the early 1990s has driven 
the provision of relatively ‘cheap’ qualifications and apprenticeships in, for instance, business 
administration and customer services, where high deadweight costs are commonly assumed 
(Fuller & Unwin, 2011). This raises the fundamental question “whether the State should be 
funding vocational provision (for both young people and adults) which is doing little more 
than accrediting skills that are relatively easily gained in the workplace” (ibid.). Also related 
to the funding regime, the NAO (2012; see also House of Commons, 2012) criticises that, in 
2010/11, more than four-fifth of all apprenticeships are found in no more than 15 framework 
subjects (out of 118). The most popular apprenticeships are fairly generic subjects that can be 
offered to apprentices in different sectors allowing training providers to offer apprenticeships 
                                                        
10 The NAO refers to providers, who believe that it was unlikely that guided hours of learning would be moni-
tored and enforced. Instead of robust monitoring, one created a system in which the apprentice is expected to 
verify that s/he received the required amount of guided learning before the receipt of the completion certificate. 
Since apprentices would not be able to complete their training if they stated that their training did not comply 
with statutory requirements, it is very unlikely that this reporting system will result in employers and providers 
complying with minimum quality standards, in addition to the problem that it is not clear what guided learning 
actually means 
11 According to a 2009 survey, 43% of providers do not collect fees from employers, suggesting it was possible 
to offer higher quality training for the same costs if fees were collected. 
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in bulk and to exploit greater economies of scale. This casts doubts on the extent to which 
training providers actually respond to local demands, or whether providers (with very proac-
tive sales teams) largely limit their activities to apprenticeships which they can provide easily 
and cheaply. On the issue of costs and compensation, the NAO (2012) finds that the tariffs for 
different apprenticeships are not based on robust information with regards to the costs of 
training, which essentially means that we do not know whether the public is “paying training 
providers too much for some apprenticeships” (House of Commons, 2012: 5). This might fur-
ther drive providers into offering only a limited range of the most profitable apprenticeships.  
For a better understanding of employer engagement in apprenticeships, we need to 
consider corporate decision-making. Some suggest that firms make “very precise calculations 
of the costs and benefits of initial vocational education” (Pilz 2009: 64); whereas others as-
sume much more subjective assessments and suggest that firms greatly rely on word-of-
mouth and typically refer to the experience of other companies (National Audit Office, 2005; 
OECD 2009). There might indeed be very good reasons to challenge the idea that ‘very pre-
cise calculations’ are actually possible in VET provision, yet it is difficult to refute that em-
ployers engage in some form of cost/benefit analysis before committing to apprenticeships. 
British companies are typically seen as viewing labour and training costs from a short-term 
perspective, undermining long-term investments into training that are perceived as a risky en-
deavour (Hillmert, 2008; Lloyd & Payne, 2002). Although one might want to criticise this 
behaviour (in addition to the observation that British firms relate vocational skills to specific 
activities in a company, as compared to the occupational approach to vocational skills in 
Germany; Pilz, 2009), it might be sensible to ‘accept’ this parameter when trying to under-
stand employers’ reluctance to commit to VET provision. Contributing to the low employer 
demand for apprenticeships, it has been argued that English apprentices are relatively well 
paid compared to some Continental European countries with high numbers of apprentices (see 
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Table 1). In addition, apprenticeship durations of three to four years in the Continent allow 
employers to ‘recoup’ some their training costs and might even allow them to ‘break even’ in 
the second half of the apprenticeship. By contrast, a Level 2 apprenticeship in England typi-
cally takes between 9 months to 1 year, whereas 18 months to 2 years are normally needed to 
complete a Level 3 apprenticeship. These shorter durations make a business case for appren-
ticeships (especially, high-quality vocational training) much more difficult (Steedman, 2010).  
 
Table 1: Index of Average Weekly Apprentice Pay, 2006 
England 100 
Austria 55 
Germany  73 
Switzerland 36 
Source: Steedman 2010: 4 
 
Employer investment in VET and specifically apprentices becomes even riskier, if one con-
siders the danger of ‘poaching’ as mentioned earlier (see also National Audit Office, 2005). 
Some observers, for this reason, have argued that the UK’s flexible labour market is in-
compatible with high employer engagement in VET provision (especially, through ap-
prenticeships); and, accordingly, have called for greater labour market regulation as an 
integral part of a more fundamental re-design of the UK’s political economy in order to 
overcome the short-term perspective and, more generally, low-cost routes to profit-
making of many employers (Brockmann, et al., 2010; Lloyd & Payne, 2002). There 
might be very good reasons why the UK’s liberal market economy is not most prone to 
VET provision, as highlighted in the VoC literature with its notion of complementarities 
(Hall & Soskice 2001; see also Green, 2001). Whilst increasing the minimum wage, for 
20 
 
instance, might block off some low-costs routes to profit-making (Lloyd & Payne 2016), 
it is rather debatable as to whether greater regulation of the labour market would make 
English employers to fundamentally reconsider their appreciation of VET and especially 
apprenticeships. Admittedly, greater employment protection might increase employees’ will-
ingness to invest in specific skills (as suggested by the VoC literature), however, it is less 
clear whether greater labour market regulation would facilitate greater employer engagement, 
as employees would still have the freedom to leave their employer in the event of a better job 
offer. The key problem of poaching that is often associated with the UK’s liberal labour 
market remains unaddressed by greater employment protection. Approaching the issue 
from a cross-national point of view, the evidence for greater workplace learning in regulated 
labour markets is far from conclusive. Whilst Germany and Austria have indeed a fairly regu-
lated labour market with high employment protection by international standards, Switzerland 
is characterised by a rather flexible labour market (see OECD.Stat for employment protection 
data). 
Instead of pursuing stricter employment protection, the comparison with German-
speaking apprenticeship countries suggests that lower ‘apprenticeship wages’ combined with 
a longer duration of apprenticeship might allow a more favourable ‘cost/benefit calculation’ 
of apprenticeships for greater firm involvement. Alternatively, a greater ‘intervention’ in 
training provision might be the introduction of training levies. Page and Hillage (2006) draw 
our attention to training levies in the film and construction industries, and Steedman proposes 
that sector levies could “contribute to the costs of sector skills bodies and thereby increase 
employer commitment” (2011: 7). Even the OECD, not typically known for heavy interven-
tionism, suggests that the country “may need to consider more coercive measures, for instance 
sectoral or universal training levies” (2009: 26) to overcome the persistent market failure in 
skills formation.  
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There is also strong evidence suggesting that employer engagement is undermined by 
little institutional continuity in English VET policy, which is seen as being characterised by 
“particularly high levels of complexity, instability and uncertainty” (Halász, 2011: 581). As 
shown, the policy field has been subject to considerable policy activism since the 1990s creat-
ing a very complex and unstable policy-setting. High complexity and especially uncertainty, 
however, is “a major obstacle to increasing employer engagement” (ibid: 582). For instance, 
with Sector Skills Councils, a sectoral dimension was added to the territorial one (the latter 
important for funding), duplicating administrative and governance structures, whereas 
UKCES was established with the intention to provide “strategic leadership” (ibid: 588). In 
terms of VET provision, FE colleges had traditionally played the most important role, but 
they were challenged by more specialised private training institutions. Also, with regard to the 
funding regime (which requires a “truly staggering amount of submission writing, documen-
tation, data recording and data returns”; Steedman, 2011: 5), many employers report great dif-
ficulty understanding the system, undermining their readiness to engage in VET; this of 
course applies in particular to smaller businesses, as these lack specialised HR staff. In short, 
as the National Audit Office remarks, “public funding is complicated and time-consuming to 
research” (2005: 32), and its paperwork ‘swallows’ a substantial chunk of government fund-
ing for apprenticeships (Steedman, 2011). With a similar impetus, the OECD assesses that 
policy structures “are both more complex and more unstable than in most other OECD coun-
tries” and concludes that this ”inhibits employer engagement” (2009: 13) and leaves many 
employers somewhat confused (see also National Audit Office, 2005). UKCES also finds 
“evidence that key stakeholders including employers, education and training providers, and 
learners find the system difficult to understand and navigate” (2013: 33). 
Some ambiguity, however, is created insofar as employers commonly call, on the one 
hand, for less bureaucracy and a simpler system (with more easily readable qualifications); 
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yet, on the other hand, business contributes to greater complexity by demanding to take into 
account their company-specific skills demands (Halász, 2011; National Audit Office 2005). 
UKCES (2013) reports more than 16,500 qualifications, with extremely variable numbers of 
participants across qualifications. Thus, whilst employer engagement might be critical for 
successful VET provision, there are also situations when their engagement “may be undesira-
ble – as when employer influence narrows training down to employer-specific skills at the 
expense of the transferable skills which will be more useful both to the worker and the UK 
economy” (OECD, 2009: 18). Overall, the UK VET and apprenticeship system is seen as be-
ing narrowly geared towards current employer needs (Hogarth, et al., 2012).  
Despite the rhetoric of employer-driven reforms, English VET policy developed “from 
a relatively uncoordinated system (…) to a highly centralised system” (Rainbird, 2010: 266) 
intervening into the supply side of the labour market. Vocational skills formation became ef-
fectively part of the education system with the state providing most funding (ibid.). Admitted-
ly, some employers have been creative in taking advantage of this system and used public 
funds for narrow firm-specific training. Payne and Keep (2011) conclude that employers have 
been rather ‘savvy’ in securing training funding, which they otherwise had to mobilise them-
selves; and they accordingly suggest relatively high deadweight (i.e. an inefficient resource 
allocation). The dominant role of the state has largely ‘crowded out’ other stakeholders, in-
cluding employers, which have little ownership and influence. Hence, VET, including appren-
ticeships, has developed into “an instrument of State policy” (Fuller & Unwin, 2009: 405).   
 
Conclusions and Discussion: Is Meaningful Vocational Training possible in England? 
Whilst an ambitious VET agenda of workforce upskilling might require “a very strong lead 
from government” (OECD, 2009: 5), it has become clear that the policy activism of different 
governments was of only very limited success. England failed to break with its troubled lega-
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cy of VET policy, and insofar one might indeed want to argue that England remained caught 
in the low skills/low productivity equilibrium. VET policy failed to pursue a clear break with 
the tradition of the Youth Training scheme of the 1980s, as Level 2 qualifications (most with 
little labour market value) continued to dominate policy – despite the knowledge that invest-
ments in Level 3 skills yield greater returns. The predominance of low-level qualifications 
combined with the rise of adult VET raise serious doubts over the effectiveness and efficiency 
of resource allocation, questioning the meaningfulness of current, state-funded skills for-
mation in England. Thus, considerable government intervention in the liberal training regime, 
including the mobilisation of considerable financial resources, did not result in overcoming 
poor vocational skills in the workforce, as government intervention failed to facilitate coordi-
nation mechanisms for greater employer engagement. The lack of employer engagement re-
mains a major problem, and the ‘door’ to genuine workplace learning, as aspired with appren-
ticeships, has remained ‘closed’. Although the greater (financial) stake of the state in VET 
might be viewed as a departure from the liberal training regime, we need to consider that the 
delivery of state-funded VET relies greatly on market mechanisms with the rise of private 
training providers. Also, the voluntarism towards private training providers (that is the lack of 
solid quality standards in VET provision, and training providers steering VET provision) ap-
pears to have undermined high-quality VET, suggesting that the VET market has failed. Un-
surprisingly, government has not been successful in elevating the social status of VET. 
The absence of any significant change in the political-economic set-up suggests that 
both conservative and Labour governments approached VET provision as a public policy 
problem. The continued policy failure raises the issue whether the voluntarism of England’s 
training regime has reached an end or, in other words, whether more fundamental reforms are 
inevitable for meaningful vocational skills formation. From a political economy perspective, 
fundamental changes in the British political economy are a pre-requisite for successful voca-
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tional skills formation. Lloyd and Payne, for instance, call “for radical economic and social 
modernisation” (2002: 367), including not only active state industrial policy but also greater 
labour market regulation and stronger trade unions. They identify organised labour as “crucial 
agency of change” (ibid: 373), and continue that a “high skills project in the UK could not be 
a happy consensual affair” (ibid: 374). With a similar impetus Brockman et al (2010) call for 
more regulated industrial relations and labour market, as well as a greater involvement of 
trade unions in education and training. This is not to argue that the political economy perspec-
tive does not offer ‘incremental’ recommendations that do not fundamentally challenge Brit-
ain’s liberal market economy. Brockman et al (2010), for instance, rightly highlight the im-
portance of investments in FE colleges for better equipped workshops; and Lloyd and Payne 
(2006: 476) emphasise that they “are not fundamentally opposed to gradualism or small steps 
forward”. Ultimately, however, it is maintained that “radical institutional transformation” 
(ibid: 473) calling into question the fundamentals of the British economy is required.  
Yet, political economy theory, and most prominently the VoC approach with its em-
phasis on path dependence and institutional complementarities (Hall & Soskice 2001), sug-
gests that radical reform is a very unlikely endeavour. Also, the incredible weakness of 
trade unions (especially, in private sector workplaces; Baccaro & Howell 2017) make it 
appear a rather remote prospect of organised labour becoming the key agency of 
change; and in fact Lloyd and Payne acknowledge the severity of “trade union decline 
and marginalization from public policy” (2016: 211). Instead of radical reform for voca-
tional skills, the VoC literature with Soskice (1993) as its most prominent representative, who 
advised Tony Blair on education and skills, explicitly suggest mass higher education for up-
skilling the British workforce rather than Continental-style apprenticeships; and indeed, the 
expansion of higher education (Hillmert 2008; Rainbird 2010) indicates a collective up-
skilling that complies with the expectations of VoC theory, despite some considerable activ-
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ism in VET policy. And even, Lloyd and Payne conceded, during the New Labour govern-
ment, that they were “deeply pessimistic” (2006: 478), but expressed the hope that “a major 
social or economic crisis” (ibid) would open up opportunities for a radical reform project. The 
analysis presented in this paper shares their critical assessment of New Labour’s record, but 
we did not identify any major change after the global financial crisis of 2008, which for Brit-
ain in particular presented a major social and economic crisis. In fact, in the Great Recession, 
government continued on Labour’s VET trajectory whilst imposing largely uncompromising 
austerity policies -- making us conclude regress rather than progress. 
Where does this assessment leave us? Should England abandon the project to improve 
vocational intermediate skills and the related aspiration to ‘rebalance the economy’? Although 
the political economy literature provides important insights, the analysis of VET policy not 
only suggests some poor public policy-making but also policy ‘levers’ for better VET provi-
sion. A number of measures can be used to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of re-
source allocation for better results. Instead of focussing on Level 2 qualifications and adult 
apprenticeships, policy-makers, withstanding the ‘temptation’ of big enrolment figures (pos-
sibly because of electoral reasons), should take their aspiration of Level 3 qualifications seri-
ously, and combine meaningful workplace learning with off-the-job training. Thus, whilst the 
recent increase in apprenticeship numbers might look impressive, the government-
commissioned Richard Review notes “a drift towards calling many things apprenticeships 
which, in fact, are not” (Richard, 2012: 4). 
Evidence from the National Audit Office (2012) suggests that higher qualifications of-
fer a better ‘return’ for the public purse, and the OECD (2009) points to the greater apprecia-
tion of Level 3 and 4 qualifications in the labour market (see also National Audit Office 
2005). The switching of funding for the over-25s to the under-25s could release additional 
resources for more expensive Level 3 qualifications. The Richard Review makes the valuable 
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recommendation that apprenticeships “should be clearly targeted at those who are new to a 
job or role that requires sustained and substantial training” (2012: 7), which would more 
closely correspond with the Continental European practice. It is also important to underline 
the need to simplify the English VET system, in particular the funding system so that it can be 
understood more easily by stakeholders and especially employers (Steedman 2011). The re-
search discussed in this paper also suggest the need to simplify the qualification system with 
its around 16,500 different qualifications, which are difficult to read and understand by em-
ployers. Whereas greater standardisation and prescription of training content might ‘upset’ a 
few employers who were able to gear the funding system towards their narrow business 
needs, it can be expected to facilitate industry standards for the benefit of larger numbers of 
employers, in addition to learners appreciating more transferable, industry-specific skills. A 
revised VET system with an engagement of a wider range of employers might also antagonise 
private training providers, who appear to have offered ‘easy’ qualifications and apprentice-
ships in bulk rather than meeting local demands. The provision of a narrow range of service 
sector apprenticeships might also not contribute to the desired ‘rebalancing of the economy’. 
Taking the failure of voluntarism and the problem of free-riding seriously, the institu-
tional re-design of VET policy could benefit immensely from the introduction of training lev-
ies. And with some surprise, the current Conservative government introduced an apprentice-
ship levy of 0.5% of a company’s wage bill to fund 3 million apprenticeship starts by 2020. 
An allowance of 15,000 GBP, however, means that the levy does not affect businesses with a 
wage bill of less than 3 million GBP. According to the government’s estimate, only 2% of 
companies will pay the new training levy (BIS, 2015). Whilst this training levy might be a 
suitable mechanism for funding an expansion of apprenticeships, the exclusion of the vast 
majority of companies does not allow the expectation of any meaningful increase in employer 
commitment to apprenticeships across the economy. Rather, one might fear ‘more of the 
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same’, as current governmental policy does not suggest changing other fundamental parame-
ters of VET, regardless of the Trailblazer initiative for apprenticeship standards, for instance 
(HM Government, 2015). Critically, current policy does not suggest any withdrawal from the 
dominance of short Level 2 apprenticeships or a withdrawal of apprenticeships from older 
employees, who often formalise existing qualifications rather than engage in genuine skills 
formation. Longer apprenticeship durations are not only crucial for improving the quality of 
VET provision but also for allowing firms to ‘re-coup’ their monetary and non-monetary in-
vestment into training, in addition to lower remuneration for apprentices as in German-
speaking countries. However, to apprentices, modest pay during extended apprenticeships 
might only be acceptable if the quality of training improved (including a qualification that is 
widely accepted and recognised). A formalisation of a meaningful qualification at the end of 
training might prevent young people from leaving early longer apprenticeships. In the face of 
the discussed weakness of organised labour and the un-readiness of employers, this ul-
timately calls for a very strong lead from government revising the regulatory frame-
work for VET and apprenticeships in particular; and with government prioritising Lev-
el 3 qualifications in certain sectors based on identified labour market needs and indus-
trial priorities – rather than hoping for the effectiveness of the private training market, 
which largely produced Level 2 qualifications with virtually labour market returns. But 
instead of strengthening high-quality apprenticeships as initial VET for school leavers, 
the government’s recent initiative for college-based T-levels for the 16-19 year-olds (HM 
Treasury, 2017) supports the assessment of no fundamental governmental rethink of 
apprenticeships and their place in a modern economy.  
VET policy in England is at a critical juncture. The shock of the Great Recession and 
its particularly big impact on the British economy, with policy-makers calling for re-
balancing the economy, provided VET with new momentum. However, VET policy is unlike-
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ly to meet expectations, unless policy-makers are prepared to more fundamentally reconsider 
their approach to VET, in addition to rethinking their approach to industrial policy in order to 
address the demand side problem. In light of the failed skills-supply approach, a more active 
industrial policy can be considered critical for better skills utilisation by employers in order to 
address the economy’s poor productivity record (Lloyd & Payne, 2002; UKCES, 2009). Yet, 
as pointed out by Cowling and Tomlinson (2013: 2), despite the acknowledgement of poor 
productivity and the greater importance ascribed to industrial policy in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis for ‘rebalancing the economy’, among policy-makers we find “little under-
standing of what policy frameworks and guidelines may be needed to achieve more long term 
sustainable productive activities”. With a similar impetus and actually a rather sceptical out-
look, Berry (2016: 882) argues that “post-crisis industrial policy innovation represents a shift 
in policy discourse not matched by policy substance” – with policy innovation undermined by 
ideational constraints and the lack of institutional resources. Admittedly, meaningful industri-
al policy might be seen a challenge to Britain’s liberal tradition, and it is not easy to achieve 
either, as the recent (non-) development of industrial policy suggests. Yet, it does not require 
a fundamental configuration of the political economy but still presents an integral part of ef-
fective skills policy. In any case, we cannot expect England to move onto a ‘German’ trajec-
tory of VET provision. Not only much of political economy theory but also the policy transfer 
and learning literatures tell us about the limits of institutional re-design following internation-
al best practice (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Thus, on the one hand, the expectations about the 
reform capacity of English VET policy should remain reasonable; on the other hand, the here 
presented analysis of English VET suggest some significant room for public policy for better 
VET provision. Critics like Soskice might still insist that VET policy remains a futile endeav-
our, but Lloyds and Payne, though we remain sceptical about the prospect of a “radical” trans-
formation, have a good point when they argue “we shall not know how much space really ex-
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ists (…) in the UK until such a project is attempted” (Lloyds & Payne 2002: 386) in a mean-
ingful manner; and possibly gradual change through a ‘less ambitious’ public policy strategy 
might open up future room for more transformative change. 
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